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Abstract
We contribute to the literature of economic performance and institutions by analysing
how the interplay between historical legal roots and ethnic heterogeneity can determine
current economic outcomes estimating various specifications of the national production
function. Our empirical investigation includes a sample of 35 Sub-Saharan (SSA) coun-
tries which are typically characterised by a high degree of ethnic fragmentation, often
emanating from haphazardly drawn colonial borders, while the legal systems in Africa
have been exogenously implanted by the respective colonial powers. Our main results
show that although the adoption of common British law (Common) is generally asso-
ciated with better economic outcomes, in the presence of high ethnic heterogeneity the
French civil law (Civil) outperforms British common law in terms of national economic
performance because it is more effective in promoting political stability, and coordina-
tion. The latter characteristic is necessary for the efficient use of natural resources that
are often abundant in SSA countries and constitute a major source of government revenue.
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1 Introduction
The paper aims at contributing to the debate on how historical aspects of the institutional
framework drive the current process of development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries –
an issue recently reinvigorated by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2020. We focus on legal
origins, which, we argue, largely embody the differences in the colonial style of the French and
British colonizers in SSA countries. The colonial style has left a lasting legacy in the post-
independence era shaping the current institutional frame, which governs the contemporary
economic and social life in Africa (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Gennaioli and Rainer
2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2020). The two dominant types of legal systems in SSA
are the British Common law (Common) and the French Civil law (Civil). The legacy of the
colonial style and key features of the legal system of the colonizer have been transplanted into
the colonies and maintained in the post-colonization period.1 Essentially, each legal system
represents a different variety of capitalism and a different way of handling socio-economic
problems that matter for economic development, social cohesion, and political stability (La
Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; Schiehll and Martins 2016; Schnyder, Siems, and Aguilera
2018). Although the existing literature has explored the role of legal origins, in general, on
various aspects of economic life (La Porta et al. 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2012),
it is yet scarce and inconclusive as to which legal tradition is more appropriate for economic
development (Magnin 2018) as well as how country characteristics affect the performance of
each legal tradition (Whitley 1999).
The literature suggests that institutional quality differences explain about three quarters of
the differences in GDP per capita in the developing world (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009; Chang
2011).The main lesson from this empirical evidence is that institutions of better quality enhance
investment in both physical and human capital, as well as promote the efficient use of national
production inputs (Cavalcanti and Novo 2005; Alguacil, Cuadros, and Orts 2011). Within this
context, legal origins reflect the colonial legacy and the historical input that shape at present
the institutional environment in SSA former colonies. In our analysis, the impact of colonial
legacy in the current socio-economic life help us to understand: (a) the country’s capacity to
resolve societal conflict (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001), and (b) country’s effectiveness in
utilizing natural resources (Maseland 2018).
1This transplantation includes the transmission of various bundles of codes, practices, and ideologies that largely
represent the style of the coloniser. Some recent studies question the importance of legal origins and colonial
style for current development placing more emphasis on democracy as an engine for economic development
(Parent 2018). We argue that the quality of current institutions follows a historical path whose roots largely
lie within colonial heritage as represented by legal origins. Evidence about the importance of legal origins
for current institutional quality is also found in Emenalo, Gagliardi, and Hodgson 2018. Nonetheless our
study provides a new perspective as to what country specific characteristics determine the effectiveness of
different legal origins and colonial legacies. Our study provides a new perspective as to what country specific
characteristics determine the effectiveness of different legal origins and colonial legacies.
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Ethnic heterogeneity is widely recognised as a major source of societal conflict that threat-
ens the cohesiveness of the society (Easterly and Levine 1997;Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
2020). Given the importance of ethnic heterogeneity in driving cross-country differences in
economic development (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003; Bertocchi and Guerzoni
2012), we explore whether economic performance in SSA former colonies depends on the inter-
action of ethnic heterogeneity with colonial style. A key element of French colonial rule is the
importance of a centralised state which subjects individuals from different ethnic groups under
a central administration. In the colonial period, the French state represented a system of a
centralised bureaucracy with very limited power to be assigned to local elites. It was within
the power of the colonial state to decide about taxation, land and labour laws, without any
assigning any intermediate role to local authorities. In the post-colonial period, the machin-
ery of administration was taken over by a new (local) elite maintaining the same, colonial-like
structure. In contrast to the French colonial legacy, the British style of colonialism was much
less dependent on the central metropolitan power. The British government preferred to assign
rights to local elites with the establishing of mediating networks that were in charge of the
maintenance of the British rule and sovereignty (Wilson 1994). In independence, the new post
colonial state adopted the specificities of the colonizer’s legal prototype that became the main
institutional vehicle for governing the socio-economic life.
The main objective of the present paper is to identify the capabilities of each legal system
to handle effectively economic and societal problems that are related to ethnic fragmentation.
Specifically, we investigate the role of French civil law and British common law as inherited
institutional devices in the economic and political governance of SSA countries. We view as
a major contribution of our paper the analysis of the combined effect of the legal origins and
ethnic heterogeneity on national economic outcomes - a link that has not attracted attention in
the literature despite its critical relevance for former colonies. While ethnic heterogeneity and
legal origins have been studied separately and found to be important determinants of socio-
economic outcomes (Hodler 2006; La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), there is no study that
focuses on the interplay between the two. Without studying the joint effect, our understanding
of the implications of legal origins on current economic performance remains incomplete, as
there are substantial differences in the way that civil and common law confront issues related
to ethnic fragmentation. Our study is the first one that takes an integrated approach to the
interaction of historical institutions (Civil vs. Common) with current societal characteristics
which jointly determine the economic and welfare conditions in SSA countries. The rest of the
paper is organised as follows: section 2 summarises the relevant literature on legal origins and
ethnic fractionalisation and develops a conceptual framework to guide the empirical analysis
that follows in section 3; section 4 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Formulation
Hall and Jones 1999 provide compelling evidence that the differences in output per worker
across countries are strongly associated with the differences in social infrastructure. The latter
is defined as the combination of underlying institutions and public policies. Social infrastructure
favourable to economic performance includes the minimisation of resource diversion and fair
price setting, such that individuals capture the social returns to their actions as private returns
(North and Thomas, 1973). In the spirit of Hayek, which is also endorsed in La Porta, Silanes,
and Shleifer 2008, legal origins shape the basis of social infrastructure in governing the style of
social and economic life.2
In African countries the legal system and the administrative structure was inherited from
colonisers. We focus on the French civil law and the British common law as French and British
are historically the major empires that exercised power in the SSA region. Coloniser’s legal
system was used to establish the administration and the machinery of social control in the
colonial state, with the structure of this machinery maintained in its main principles in the
post-colonial era. The French civil law has a centralised structure for controlling social and
economic life. In the colonial era, France assimilated colonies under a centralised authority,
which enacted legislation under the Presidential rule (Young 1994; Blanton, Mason, and Athow
2001). In independence, the post-colonial states maintained the same structure, whose main
concern was to promote state-desired allocations of national resources and deal effectively with
social disorder insuring that the state elites maintained the existing status quo.
The British common law system has a more decentralised orientation that favours private
market outcomes to central concentration and state-controlled allocations. With reference to
the colonial period, the British colonial style maintained indigenous elites as long as they could
service the British colonial rule. 3 In independence, the British left in place an unranked system
of social and ethnic stratification contrary to former French colonies, which sustained a more
ranked system of social organisation (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001). Within our context,
these distinct differences in colonial style were largerly predetermined by the legal system of
the coloniser which was then adopted in the post-colonial era of the former colonies. More
importantly, we show that the differences in colonial style and the underlying legal system
imply different responses to societal conflict and disorder in the post-colonial era which in turn
leads to different economic outcomes.
A major factor that significantly affects the likelihood of conflict and the degree of societal
cohesiveness in the post-colonial period is ethnic heterogeneity (or fragmentation) (Bleaney
2Often, in studies focusing on the substantive law characteristics, legal origins are seen as measuring the quality
of the judiciary and the security of property and contract rights.
3The style of the British coloniser could be accurately summarised into the “Divide and Rule” strategy. The
logic of this strategy was to exploit possible differences among ethnic groups in order to prevent the formation
of ethnic group alliances against the dominance of the coloniser.
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and Dimico 2017).4 Ethnic heterogeneity and tensions are particularly intense in Africa where
colonial borders were drawn randomly without capturing particular local ethnic configuration
and traditions (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2020). Ethnically heterogeneous societies may
find it difficult to coordinate and agree on the use of resources and policy design. There
is usually a high degree of political instability associated with ethnic heterogeneity, which
weakens the organisation of the government. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993 argue that
ethnic heterogeneity weakens the centralisation of control, while Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
1997 point out to weakening of the useful checks and balances. 5 Weak political governance
makes it harder to minimise resource diversion (Hodler 2006) and deal effectively with market
failure (Alesina and Wacziarg 1998). 6
In former French colonies, the elite that captures control of the state machinery in the
post-colonial period has a monopolistic power in domestic politics. The state preserves a
hegemonic role in manipulating and repressing any potential challenge against the existing
status-quo (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007). However, in order to maintain power and political
stability, the state provides better public policies and related subsistence guarantees, which is
an inhibitory factor for non-state elites to challenge the existing regime (Blanton, Mason, and
Athow 2001). 7 In former British colonies with an unranked system of social stratification, a
pattern of severe competition has developed among ethnic groups aiming at gaining power over
the state’s institutional machinery. The elite that dominates over the state’s functions controls
the use of national resources and the revenue associated with them (Hodler 2006). Ethnic
groups that are excluded from the state organisation, tend to mobilise (fragmented) structures
for collective violent and non-violent action against the dominant elite, which results in conflict
and higher political fragility (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2012; Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik
2020).
A crucial political challenge for countries with a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity is to
achieve the desired level of coordination in implementing the state’s fundamental functions.
In a decentralised set-up, as it occurs in former colonies with the British common law and
ethnic homogeneity, the separation of powers (i.e. executive vs. judiciary) can and would
4Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et al. 2003 and Hodler 2006 show that ethnic heterogeneity in Africa explains
a large part of cross-country differences in public policies and the economic outcomes resulted from them. These
studies demonstrate that ethnic heterogeneity influences economic performance, and most of the effect works
indirectly.
5According to the ”political agenda” effect (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik 2020) there should not be incentives
for fragmented elites to create centralised power in the hands of a national state. This is because, in the absence
of state centralization, citizens would not band together so elites can more easily keep control, while under
state centralization citizens of different ethnicities would coordinate their demands in the direction of more
general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers.
6See Easterly and Levine 1997 on how ethnic heterogeneity is linked to competitive rent-seeking, black-market
premiums, poor financial development, low provision of infrastructure, and low levels of education.
7It is important to point out that the centralisation of the national state in the SSA context could sometimes
be manifested in authoritarian regimes, but this is not necessarily a feature of the centralised national state
per se; authoritarian regimes do also exist in common law SSA countries (i.e.Zimbabwe).
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more easily coordinate decisions and actions of multiple government actors (La Porta, Silanes,
and Shleifer 2008). In this case, the presence of effective checks and balances between the
powers ensures good governance. For checks and balances to be effective two conditions must
be fulfilled (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997): (i) conflict of interest between the executive
and the legislature and (ii) joint agreement on legislative decision-making by both bodies. A
mere satisfaction of one of the two conditions does not suffice to improve accountability, both
conditions must hold simultaneously.The existence of different ethnic groups with divergent
interests in former British common law colonies makes condition (ii) unlikely to hold due to
elites’ divergent and competing interests in controlling national resources (Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini 1997; Hodler 2006; Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik 2020). In other words, the limited
ability of the (central) government to implement cohesive policies results in a bad national
equilibrium, where different ethnic groups have contradicting interests and make independent
claims on national resources. Therefore the lack of a strong centralised administration system in
ethnically fragmented societies worsens accountability, and creates a ”common-pool” problem
with each ethnic group seeking the largest possible share until the national endowment is
exhausted (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; Hodler 2006).
In summary, ethnic heterogeneity in former SSA colonies is a serious obstacle for achieving
an optimal socio-political equilibrium that integrates the consensus from all different groups. On
the grounds of difficulties associated with ethnic heterogeneity, different legal colonial legacies
create different level of effectiveness in economic governance.
The decentralised system of governance in British common law countries results in a less sta-
ble economic environment with a high frequency of ethnic conflict, while the more centralised
structure of administration in French civil law countries mitigates conflicts more effectively
and ensures higher levels of political stability. In SSA countries under the French civil law,
coordination among government actors is more likely to happen as dominant elites have al-
ready penetrated the state excluding any subordinate groups from mobilising forces that could
potentially challenge the status quo. Based on the above arguments, we formulate our main
hypotheses:
H1 Economic performance in ethnically heterogeneous societies is better enhanced under the
French civil law where the centralised state is dominant and able to enforce coordination.
Two corollary hypotheses are also formulated from H1 that identify the supremacies of
civil law over common law in providing better economic outcomes. This is mainly achieved
through the channels of higher political stability and more effective use of natural resources.
Thus, we specify two additional hypotheses:
H2 Former colonies under the French civil law maintain higher level of political stability that
leads to better economic outcomes.
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H3 Former colonies under the French civil law can more easily achieve coordination, which re-
sults in better utilisation of natural resources, and consequently a better national economic
performance.
The following section tests empirically our hypotheses using two alternative econometric
approaches. The first approach specifies a single-equation (baseline) model of income per capita
similar to the regression framework used in the institutional literature. The novel element in
our approach is the use of a new estimator that addresses systematically the time-invariant
nature of the two variables of main interest - Civil and Ethnic. The second approach refers
to the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which estimates the production frontier of the 35
SSA countries. Within this framework, we can identify whether Civil and Ethnic (among other
factors) contribute to the efficient use of national resources (i.e. improve inefficiency), thus
closing the gap that separates each country from the best possible use of resources (i.e. the
production frontier). Results from the two alternative estimation approaches provide ample
evidence for drawing economic inference regarding the validity of our three hypotheses.
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3 Empirical analysis
This section develops the empirical strategy of the paper. We test the conceptual propositions
of the previous section in an unbalanced panel of 35 SSA countries over the period 1970-2013.8.
We first report results from cross-country regressions that associate Civil with better governance
outcomes relative to Common after controlling for ethnic heterogeneity. These regressions are
conditional on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity (ethnic) in the country and its interaction
with Civil.
Next, we develop the baseline econometric model that deals more systemically with the
time fixed nature of civil and ethnic variables. In the second part of the empirical analysis,
we estimate the production frontier in the sample of SSA countries investigating whether legal
origins and ethnic heterogeneity, among other (economic) factors, are important determinants
for explaining output deviations from the frontier.9
3.1. Illustrative Regressions.
Cross-country OLS regressions are used to illustrate the relationship between Civil and two
notions of political stability. These regressions reflect upon our previous discussion that coun-
tries adopting civil law have a higher level of coordination, which results in higher political
stability and lower conflict. We regress the mean values (1970-2013) of political stability (Sta-
bility) and conflict intensity of 35 SSA countries on time-invariant indices of Civil and Ethnic,
and initial GDP per capita GDPC70. The first two specifications in Table 1, regress Stability
on Civil, Ethnic and the interaction term Civil × Ethnic. Stability combines scores from var-
ious sources regarding perceptions about the likelihood that the government in power will be
destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or other violent means (Worldwide Governance
Indicators; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).The index runs from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher
values corresponding to higher levels of political stability. Civil defined as a dummy with value
one if the country adopts the French civil law and zero otherwise (La Porta et al. 1999).The
reference category in Civil is the British common law. Ethnic is a time-invariant index defined
as the probability of two random people in a country not sharing the same racial and linguistic
characteristics (Alesina et al. 2003). GDPC70 is income per capita in 1970 and accounts for
initial conditions in each country (World Bank Development Indicators). Specification 3 and 4
in Table 1 regress an index of conflict intensity Conflict)(Stiftung 2014) on the same variables.
Conflict ranges between 1 and 10 with low values indicating no violent incidents due to reli-
gious, ethnic, and social differences, while high values show widespread violent conflicts within
8The sample of countries include: Angola,Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
9Deviations from the frontier are due to inefficient use of national resources. In other words, we seek to identify
whether civil and ethnic are (in)efficiency related factors.
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the society.
Regressions in Table 1 examine predictions for Stability and Conflict conditional on Ethnic,
Civil, and GDPC70 and they are identical to specifications used in the institutions and growth
literature (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik 2020; Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson 2014. We
should note that Ethnic and Civil variables can be safely regarded as pre-determined in cross-
sectional regressions.10 If there were unobserved factors that influenced both colonial legacies
and ethnic heterogeneity then the relations presented in Table 1 cannot be considered as causal,
but even so, the conditional predictions are of interest in understanding how Civil and Ethnic
drive cross-country differences in political stability and conflict outcomes.
Table 1: The Effect of Civil Law on Government Stability and Conflict,
Cross-Country Regressions for 35 SSA Countries.Period Covered 1970-2013
Stability Stability Conflict Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civil 0.070*** 0.180*** -0.43** -0.25**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.02)
Ethnic -0.192*** -0.373*** 0.085*** 0.093***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07)
Civil×Ethnic 0.208** -0.086***
(0.13) (0.12)
GDPC70 0.268 0.114*** -0.018* -0.009
(0.37) (0.04) (0.12) (0.16)
N 35 35 35 35
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.17 0.46 0.45
Log lik. -24159 -24190 -20112 -20008
OLS beta coefficients with country robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10%.
OLS estimates in Table 1 are specified with country robust standard errors in parentheses.
For each political variable in Table 1 we run two regressions – with and without the interac-
tion term Civil×Ethnic. Countries under civil tend to have a higher level of political stability
and lower conflict intensity. Ethnic decreases political stability and increases conflict intensity,
whereas the interaction term implies that ethnically heterogeneous countries with Civil(i.e.a
more centralised state) tend to be more politically stable and encounter lower conflict intensity.
This cross-country evidence reinforces partly H1 and H2 in the sense that the French colonial
legacy in conditions of ethnic heterogeneity tends to generate better outcomes of political gover-
nance. Our baseline econometric model in the next section addresses the time-invariant nature
10Legal origins are typically considered as valid instruments in the growth and financial development literature,
see (Porta et al. 1998).
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of Civil and Ethnic and provides further evidence about their combined effect on economic
performance.
3.2. Estimation Strategy: The Baseline Model.
The main objective of the empirical model is to assess the effects of Civil and Ethnic on





where Y is output and X is a vector of standard production inputs including capital stock
(K ), labour input(L) and human capital (H ) in country i at year t. Parameters β are to be
estimated. Variable C stands for country specific idiosyncrasies. In estimating (1), we encounter
two notable challenges, first, Civil and Ethnic represent time invariant characteristics. This
means that Civil and Ethnic cannot be disentangled from other individual unobserved fixed
effects included in Ci. In this case, the use of a standard within fixed effect (WFE) estimator
becomes inappropriate. Second, there is an issue of unobserved endogeneity bias between Ci
and production inputs. Although OLS estimates for β parameters are unbiased in the presence
of endogeneity, there is endogeneity bias between Civili, Ethnici and Yit. In a historical
perspective, colonisation was not a random process, colonisers choose territories that fulfil
specific requirements as far as natural resources, geographical proximity to ports, distance
from the Atlantic and Indian oceans, and development conditions in the pre-colonisation era
are concerned. Therefore, legal origins might not be totally exogenous or predetermined as
argued in La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer 2008.
To control for this type of endogeneity bias, we consider the fixed effects filter estimator
(FEF) of Pesaran and Zhou 2018.The main steps of this static panel data estimator are outlined
below:




iρ + ωit (2)
where yit is the log value of output, xit is a vector with the log values of time variant regressors
(k, l and h) and zi is the vector of observed time-invariant regressors and ρ are parameters
to be estimated. The model includes a unit unobserved heterogeneity parameter a that is
decomposed as:
ai = α + ξi (3)
The key issue in estimating (2) is to identify consistent parameters for ρ imposing restrictions on
ai. The FEF estimator produces parameters for ρ in two steps. In step one, a WFE estimator
computes parameter values for the time-variant regressors xit. These estimates are then used
to filter out the time-varying effects. In a more compact form, the first step computes β̂ and
the associated residuals û are defined as: ûit = yit − β̂
′
xit.
In step two, residuals from step one are averaged across units and regressed on an intercept
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and a vector of time-invariant variables z: ¯̂ui = α̂F EF + ρ̂
′
F EF zi.
FEF estimator is found to be asymptotically consistent for a finite time sample and a
sufficiently large number of observations like the structure of the present panel. Finally, the
FEF estimator is robust in arbitrary heteroscedasticity and unbiased in the presence of serial
correlation in ωit (Pesaran and Zhou 2018). With reference to endogeneity, the FEF estimator
remains valid even if the time-varying regressors xit in (2) are not exogenous, E(xit, ξi 6= 0). This
FEF property is rather appealing as the only requirement for obtaining consistent estimates for ρ
is the use of possible time-invariant instruments outside the regressors specified in the model.11In
the FEF-IV (instrumental variable) estimator, we instrument time-invariant regressors (zi) with
historical variables that mainly capture precolonial conditions in SSA countries. Specifically,
the set of instruments include: the distance from the Sahara, the distance from the Atlantic,
the population density in 1400 AD (Nunn 2008), and the state of development in the 19th
century (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007).
3.3. Data Sources and Variable Definitions.
We estimate two variant specifications of (2), one in absolute levels (Table 2) and one
in per-capita terms (Table 3); the data used are described next. Output (Y ) is GDP in
constant 2005 USD, capital stock (K ) is derived from the accumulation of investment flows
(inv) expressed in constant 2005 USD. The perpetual inventory equation for the capital stock
series is: Kit = (1 − δ)Kit−1 + invit−1, where δ is the rate of physical depreciation assumed to
be constant across countries and years at 15%. The initial capital stock is derived from the
steady state condition: K0i = inv0i/(ḡi + δ), where ḡi is the average growth rate of investment
in country i over the sample period and inv0i is investment in the first year of the sample in
each country. Labour (L) is the number of workers employed and human capital (H ) is the
average years of schooling for the population (15 years old and above). Data for Y, inv, L
are taken from the Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015),while data
for H are taken from the from Barro and Lee 2013 data set. Barro-Lee data are available in
five years intervals; we generate values for years in between using linear interpolation (Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare 2005).Civil is taken from La Porta et al. 1999 and Ethnic heterogeneity
is from Alesina et al. 2003.12Appendix A provides summary statistics of all variables used in
the paper.
As a robustness test, we augment the per-capita specifications (Table 3) with additional re-
gressors. Specifically, we consider FDI as a determinant that stimulates capital deepening and
enhances technology transfer from multinational enterprises of advanced economies (Rodriguez
and Rodrik 2000; Li and Liu 2005; Busse and Groizard 2008). We measure FDI as the share
11The FEF estimator builds upon the two-stage random effects estimator of Taylor and Hausman (TH) (1981).
The main difference between FEF and TH is that the latter estimator requires time-varying regressors xit (at
least a sufficient number of them) to be exogenous, E(xit, ξi = 0), so they can be used as instruments for the
time invariant regressors. The FEF estimator relaxes this exogeneity restriction.
12Or ethnic fractionalisation as it is originally labelled in Alesina et al. 2003.
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of FDI inflows to GDP (FDI). FDI data are collected from various issues of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS). Furthermore, we include
the share of imports to GDP (Trade) and obtain the data from World Development Indicators
(WDI). Trade contributes to the efficient allocation of resources through gains of specialisation
as well as it helps developing countries to assimilate knowledge from trading partners (Bour-
nakis, Christopoulos, and Mallick 2018). To account for the role of natural resource in SSA
countries we use the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forestry
rents as a share of GDP (Resources) and obtain the data from WDI. Finally, we consider
whether the the degree of development of financial markets is a determinant of income per
capita. The financial system is the mediator between savers and borrowers channelling credit
into economic activities with high value-added and high rates of return (“Financial development
and growth”). Credit is defined as the domestic credit to GDP and data are taken from WDI.
3.4. Baseline Estimation Results. Table 2 shows estimates from two parsimonious
specifications, which include the coefficients of production inputs and two time-invariant factors,
Civil and Ethnic. Regarding the coefficients of production inputs in (1), human capital(βh) is
the factor with the highest returns due to relatively higher scarcity, which leads to proportionally
larger output increases after small increments in that input. In the FEF-IV estimation in (2),
the size of the human capital coefficient decreases but it is still economically and statistically
high. A similar pattern appears for the capital input (βk). Turning to the coefficients of Civil
and Ethnic both are negative and statistically significant. Recall, Civil is a dummy variable
with reference group (i.e.the omitted category) countries with the British common law. The
effects accord previous findings in the literature that emphasise the common stance about the
supremacy of British common over French civil law in generating better economic outcomes for
a number of reasons (La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). 13 Similarly, Ethnic has a negative
effect pointing out the distortions that ethnic fragmentation causes by preventing coordination
that ensures an efficient allocation of national resources.
13The most prominent channel is that common law provides a more effective framework for the protection of
property rights, which enhances private investment.
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Table 2: Output Determinants in 35 SSA Countries 1970-2013:Fixed Effects

















Overall Civil Effect 0.102 0.068
Number of countries 35 32
Average number of years per country 43 44
N 1540 1408
Robust standard errors for arbitrary heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses.
*** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10%.
The instruments used in the FEF-IV specification are the country’s distance from the Sahara,
the country’s distance from the Atlantic,the population density in 1400 AD (Nunn 2008),
and the state of development in the 19th century (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007).
Importantly, the interaction Civil × Ethnic provides a statistically significant and positive
coefficient in both specifications. Coefficients from the FEF-IV estimators tend to be higher
implying that estimates about time-invariant characteristics are downward biased without cor-
recting for unobserved endogeneity bias. Intuitively, the positive sign of the interaction term
suggests that the destabilising effect due to higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity can be better
attenuated in countries with French civil law, in turn, leading to better economic outcomes.
This result favours the suitability of the French civil law in an array of matters that are crucial
for fragmented societies, including the functionality of government as well as the operation of
the executive and judiciary authorities. Essentially, our results highlight the beneficial role
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of a centralised system of governance in maintaining the status quo, which prevents (lack the
incentives for) subordinate ethnic groups to undertake collective actions against the state. We
reiterate here that some SSA countries might be classified as autocratic regimes but this should
not be considered an artifact of the inherited colonial style. Furthermore, these results do
not lead to the conclusion that countries with French civil law constitute better democracies,
nonetheless as cross-country evidence in Table 1 suggests, societies following the French colonial
legacy tend to suffer from less conflicts, which is undoubtedly beneficial for economic activity.
Overall, Table 2 provides favourable evidence for H1.




= ρ̂1 + ρ̂2Ethnici
If we evaluate Ethnic at the sample median of 0.69 then the overall effect of Civil is equal
to 0.10 and 0.068 in the FEF and FEF-IV specifications,respectively. Given that y is in logs,
these values represent semi-elasticities suggesting that a civil law country in SSA achieves, on
average, 10.2% or 6.8% more output than a common law country. The results in Table 3 are
from the output per person specification yit − lit. Four alternative specifications are shown-
two parsimonious and two augmented with additional covariates.The coefficient of β k
l
is larger
than the coefficient of βh
l
. With reference to the variables of main interest, the coefficient of
Civil in columns (1) and (2) remains negative, while the interaction term Civil × Ethnic is
positive. Columns (3) and (4) include among others the covariates of Resources and Stability
and their interactions with Civil. Resources is a negative determinant of output per worker,
while the coefficient of the interaction Civil × Resources is positive.These results reinstate the
importance of a centralised system of governance, which is a feature of countries with the French
civil law, in managing problems associated with the tragedy of the natural endowments (Hodler
2006; Alao 2007).14 A similar effect is also identified for the Civil × Stability variable. The
overall effect of Civil in specifications (3) and (4) is derived from:
∂yit
∂Civili
= ρ̂1 + ρ̂2Ethnici +
ρ̂3Resourcesit + ρ̂4Stabilityit. Evaluating Ethnic, Resources and Stability at the median, the
overall effect of Civil is between 0.066 and 0.099, which indicates that a civil law country has
on average 7-10% higher output per worker than a common law country. The overall impact of
the French civil remains statistically and economically significant for income per capita in SSA
countries, which validates H1, H2 and H3.
Other determinants in (3) and (4) in Table 3 include Credit which controls for the importance
of financial markets in the development process. Financial expansion is beneficial for output as
it increases the number of businesses that have access to finance. Trade is also a positive and
statistically significant signifying the role of imported embodied technical change that enhances
14The tragedy of the endowments here refers to the struggle of developing countries that are rich in natural
resources and fail to develop other factor such as human capital, sufficient manufacturing base that enable
them to achieve a more sustainable path of development.
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productivity in SSA countries. FDI is insignificant, a common result in developing countries,
as multinationals often do not create strong ties with local economies that promote transfer
of knowledge, rather targeting countries’ natural resources and labour endowments. Finally, a
time trend is included to capture exogenous (disembodied) technical change.
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Table 3: Determinants of GDP per Capita in 35 SSA Countries 1970-2013. Fixed Effects
Filter(FEF) and FEF-Instrumental (IV) Estimations
FEF FEF-IV FEF FEF-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production Inputs
βk−l 0.281*** 0.264*** 0.269*** 0.253***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.038) (0.04)
βh−l 0.154* 0.157* 0.154* 0.194**










Civil -2.411*** -0.258* -2.001*** -1.194***
(0.667) (1.297) (0.644) (0.278)
Ethnic -2.092*** -1.425* -2.685*** -1.281***
(0.712 (0.953) (0.615) (0.85)
Civil×Ethnic 3.523*** 3.838** 2.688** 1.633***
(1.033) (1.589) (0.917) (0.226)










Number of Countries 35 32 35 32
N 1540 1408 1517 1254
Robust standard errors for arbitrary heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses.
*** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10%.
The overall effect indicates the partial derivative of output with respect to Civil. See text for further details.
The instruments used in the FEF-IV specification are the country’s distance from the Sahara,
the country’s distance from the Atlantic,the population density in 1400 AD (Nunn 2008),
and the state of development in the 19th century (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007).
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3.5. Stochastic Frontier Analysis.
In this section, we provide further evidence within a more comparative context presenting
results from the production frontier of the SSA countries. We estimate the elasticity of na-
tional output with respect to labour, fixed capital and human capital, while within the same
framework we identify the factors that prevent the efficient use of the inputs. The SFA defines
technical efficiency as the production of maximum output given the bundle of production inputs
and the state of technology. Subsequently, a country is technically efficient when it operates
at the upper boundary of its production possibility frontier. Any distance from the frontier
represents the degree of technical inefficiency in a country. The use of SFA for the purposes of
our analysis has two distinct advantages compared to the restricted specification of output per
capita shown in Tables 2 and 3. First, it measures each country’s output relative to the inter-
national best practice (the frontier). Second, SFA decomposes the distance from the frontier
into an inefficiency term and pure random noise. The inefficiency term is then modelled as a
function of observed national characteristics, among them Civil and Ethnic. The production
function in per capita terms in the SFA set up is formulated as:
(y − l)it = γ0 + γ1(k − l)it + γ2(h − l)it + υit − uit (4)
As previously, lower case letters denote log values. The error component υ represents the
standard statistical noise of the frontier with υ N(0, σ2), while uit is a non-negative stochastic
term N+ (µit, σ
2) with mean µit and constant variance. The term of interest in (4) is the
one-sided technical inefficiency error term uit driven by socio-economic factors:
µit = Z
′
itθ + ǫit (5)
where Zit is the p × 1 vector of technical inefficiency factors, θ is a 1 × p vector of unknown
parameters to be estimated; ǫit is a random error defined by the right truncation of a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance: σ2 = σ2υ + σ
2
u. Following Battese and Coelli 1995, we
estimate production parameters γ and inefficiency parameters θ in one stage.15Regarding the
inefficiency equation(5), we first consider a parsimonious specification, which is then augmented
with additional variables. This strategy allows us to scrutinise the robustness of our results
with respect to the main variables of interest- Civil and Ethnic. Three inefficiency equations
are specified:
15Applications of the SFA with country level data can be found, among others, in Kneller and Stevens (2006)
and Christopoulos and Leon-Ledesma (2014).
17
uit = θ0 + θ1Civili + θ2Ethnici + θ3[Civili × Ethnici] + θ4trendt + ǫit (5.1)
uit = θ0 + θ1Civili + θ2Ethnici + θ3[Civili × Ethnici] + θ4trendt+
+ θ5Stabilityit + θ6[Civili × Stabilityit] + θ7Creditit + θ8Tradeit + ǫit
(5.2)
uit = θ0 + θ1Civili + θ2Ethnici + θ3[Civili × Ethnici] + θ4trendt+
+ θ7Creditit + θ8Tradeit + θ9Resourcesit + θ10[Civili × Resourcesit] + ǫit
(5.3)
The parsimonious specification includes Civil, Ethnic, the interaction term between the two,
and a time trend that captures exogenous technical change. Specification (5.2) includes
Credit,Trade,Stability and the interaction term of the latter with Civil. Specification (5.3)
includes interchangeably Resources and its interaction term with Civil. Specifications (5.2) and
(5.3) are close approximations for H2 and H3, respectively.16
3.6. Efficiency Scores and Ethnic Heterogeneity.
Table 4 shows SFA estimates from the specifications (5.1)- (5.3) outlined above. The upper
panel of the table shows the estimated coefficients of the frontier (4), while the lower panel
shows the estimated parameters of the inefficiency equation (5). Since all specifications in Table
4 represent nested models, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) can be used to select the
preferred specification. Accordingly, (5.2) provides the best fit of the data, so the interpretation
of the results refers to coefficients from this specification.
16As a further test of robustness, Appendix C provides results from a Translog specification of the frontier and
estimates from additional inefficiency determinants.
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γk−l 0.772*** 0.708*** 0.801***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
γh−l 0.114*** 0.049** 0.141***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Inefficiency
Civil 0.934*** 0.830*** 0.893***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15)










trend 0.055*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Civil × Ethnic -2.862*** -2.988*** -2.044***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.12)
Civil × Stability -0.246***
(0.02)
Civil × Resources -0.12***
(0.00)
Overall Civil Effect -1.039 -1.993 -1.49
Observations 1540 1540 1540
AIC 1474.9 1313.3 1511.1
Log lik. -729.43 -643.66 -742.55
Wald 6290.99 2451.01 5416.19
Wald-pvalue 0.00 0.00 0.00
λ 0.32 0.72 0.94
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
***denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 10% significance;* denotes 10%
All specifications include time fixed effects in the frontier equation.







at the bottom of Table 4 determines the proportion in the variation
of (y − l) that is due to technical inefficiency. The maximum likelihood (ML) estimates indicate
that 72% of the variation in uit − υit in (5.2) is attributed to technical inefficiency, so there is
substantial scope to investigate further the sources of this inefficiency.
We first identify correlations between efficiency scores and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity.
Sample means of technical efficiency (TE) for each country as derived from specification (5.2)
are shown in Appendix B. The average efficiency score of the entire sample is 0.68.17. Zimbabwe,
a British common law country and relatively ethnically homogeneous, has the highest efficiency
level (0.77) in the sample. Rwanda, Chad, Madagascar, and Mauritius under French civil law
are very close to the frontier too. Irrespective of colonial legacy, countries at the top of the
efficiency ranking share the following common characteristics: low dependence on revenue from
natural resources, high levels of human capital and high trade orientation (Sachs and Warner
1997; Easterly and Levine 1997).Figure 1 plots the average efficiency scores in each country
against Ethnic.
17Not surprisingly, the efficiency scores in SSA countries are lower than figures reported for advanced economies
(Christopoulos and León-Ledesma 2014). Current efficiency scores are closer to findings for other non-SSA
developing countries (Henry, Kneller, and Milner 2009)
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Figure 1: Efficiency Scores versus Ethnic Heterogeneity in 35 Sub Saharan
African (SSA) Countries
Several points merit discussion; first, there is ample evidence of substantial ethnic hetero-
geneity in the SSA group. Most countries are placed around or to the right of the vertical
(dashed) line which marks the sample median (0.73) of Ethnic. Second, the group of countries
above the horizontal line and to the right of the vertical line are ethnically heterogeneous with
high efficiency score, above the median (0.68). Most of the countries within this plot area belong
to the civil law group (Chad, Madagascar, Congo at the top). Third, the bottom right of the
graph includes countries with high ethnic heterogeneity and low average efficiency. Tanzania
from the common law group has the worst performance with Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau
from the civil law group also close to the bottom. Despite technical efficiency following a similar
trend in civil and common law countries since 1970 (Figure 2), civil law countries consistently
dominate over common law countries in efficiency. On average, all countries in the sample expe-
rience efficiency losses close to 32%. Since, the 1980s and for about two decades, SSA countries
improve efficiency substantially, while during the 2000s there was a period of stagnancy. After
the 2000s, another downward trend is observed.18
18Botswana has improved performance substantially during the period with an average technical efficiency score
of 0.47 in the 1970s which raised to 0.751 at the end of the period. Countries with an efficiency score in the
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Figure 2: Efficiency Scores 1970-2013, 35 SSA Countries
3.7. Frontier and Inefficiency estimates.
Turning to the estimates of the frontier, γk−l and γh−l are both positive and statistically
significant. The elasticity of capital per worker is around 0.7, while the human capital coefficient
is close to 0.05. The size of the coefficient of capital per worker is high implying substantial
output returns in SSA after increments in the relatively scarce capital.19 Recall, Battese and
Coelli 1995 specify technical efficiency as: TEit = exp(−uit = exp(−Zitθ)), which means that
a negatively signed coefficient of theta is interpreted as an efficiency enhancer determinant
(i.e. reduces inefficiency) or equivalently closes the output gap from the technical frontier.
Regarding H1, the variable of main interest in Table 4 is the interaction term Civil × Ethnic.
Coefficients of the autonomous variables Civil andEthnic maintain a pattern similar to the FEF
and FEF-IV estimates in Table 3. Without considering its interplay with ethnic heterogeneity,
British common law remains a legal system more favourable to economic outcomes (La Porta,
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). Similarly, the existence of ethnic heterogeneity is a considerable
1970s already close to the sample mean are Chad, Rwanda and Burundi that kept experiencing small efficiency
gains during the period 1980-2000.
19Méon and Weill 2010 report coefficients for capital per worker no larger than 0.5 for group of countries at a
more advanced level of development than SSA.
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source of technical inefficiency. Nonetheless, the combined effect between the two is negative
and highly significant in statistical terms, which supports H1. Evaluating the overall effect of
Civil (5.2) at the median of Ethnic from:
∂uit
∂Civili
= θ̂1 + θ̂3Ethnic + θ̂6Stability
countries with French civil law have 1.99% higher efficiency relative to countries with British
common law. If we evaluate Ethnic in the 95% percentile of the sample distribution, the overall
effect of Civil increases to 2.53%. This finding highlights a new perspective, which has been
ignored to date, the interplay between colonial legacy and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in
SSA countries as a main socio-political driver of economic performance.
Table 5 calculates the total effect of key inefficiency determinants Ethnic, Stability and
Resources. Overall, a 10% increases in ethnic heterogeneity increases inefficiency by 0.88 per-
centage points. This result accords well with our previous discussion that the quality of insti-
tutions is inclined to deteriorate from ethnic fragmentation, which impacts negatively on the
effectiveness of economic governance. On the whole, Stability is a major efficiency enhancer as
shown in Table 5 with a 10% increase in the likelihood of the government not being destabilised
to signify efficiency gains at the order of 3 percent. This finding highlights the role of political
stability as a catalyst for achieving better economic outcomes and even more stresses the need
for an appropriate institutional environment that can promote it. Although the interaction
term Civil × Resources is an efficiency enhancer (i.e. negative sign) as shown in Table 4, in
the whole, Resources remain an inefficiency enhancer with a 10 percent increase in the revenue
from natural resources to increase inefficiency by 0.5 percentage point. Despite the higher effec-
tiveness of civil law in dealing with the management of natural resources, economic dependence
on natural resources per se is a distortive factor that leads to rent-seeking practices and an
uneven pattern of development. 20.





Summarising our benchmark results in Table 4 for the role of colonial legacy - as it is
represented by legal origins – in the national technical efficiency and allocation of production
inputs, the centralized style of economic governance derived from the French colonial legacy
through civil law is proved to be more effective in ethnically heterogeneous societies. Simi-
larly, the French Civil law can more easily promote political stability and alleviate challenges
20Thus,undermining investment in human capital (Gylfason 2001; Galor and Mountford 2008) and expansion
of the industrial base (Hodler 2006
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related to the control of natural resources in SSA countries, even though, abundance in natural
resource remains an obstacle to sustainable economic prosperity. The interpretation of our
results concerning the superiority of the French colonial legacy in generating better economic
outcomes in ethnically fragmented societies of SSA merits some conceptual caveats. First, the
finding that countries under civil law are more politically stable does not necessarily mean that
these societies are also pluralistic democracies, quite the opposite, these countries might have
in place authoritarian regimes with a low degree of political competition. Second, the domi-
nant groups that control state resources are powerful enough to protect the status quo from
rebellions, nonetheless, this does not guarantee that mobilization against the state will never
occur; it does sometimes occur and it might take a revolutionary form that aims at destroying
state hegemony (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik 2020).
Finally, Trade and Credit in Table 4 are efficiency enhancers. Trade stresses the importance
of trade-embodied technical change, while the development of financial markets provides the
credit channel needed for stimulating private investment. These results are consistent with
estimates from the restricted specification of output per worker in Table 3. Similarly,(trend)
shows that exogenous technical change is not an inefficiency enhancer in SSA countries. 21 Ap-
pendix C provides coefficients from a translog production function and the following inefficiency
determinants: Polity2 (Polity), life expectancy (Life) and the share of manufacturing to GDP
(Man). These are also found to be efficiency enhancing determinants but more importantly,
results for Civil and Civil × Ethnic do not change.
3.8. Counterfactual Analysis.
To better assess the differences between Civil and Common in SSA countries, we provide a
counterfactual analysis from the estimates shown in Table 4 with a comparison between actual
and predicted efficiency scores in common law countries based on the overall effect of Civil.
Specifically, we found in our preferred specification that countries adopting the civil law had on
average 1.3% higher efficiency than SSA countries under common law. As a placebo exercise,
we calculate the predicted initial score of efficiency in 1970 - the first year of the sample -
assuming that common law countries had adopted the civil law, instead. Then we re-calculate
the series of efficiency scores for Common law countries. We apply the following formula to
initiate the predicted efficiency scores for Common law countries:
ˆTE
Common






where ˆTE is the predicted technical efficiency, n is the number of years in the sample,
gi is the average growth rate of actual technical efficiency in common law country i over the
sample period and ˆTEi1970 is technical efficiency in 1970 for common law country i if it would
21Tehncial chnage in developing countries is either input biased or trade augmented as already shown in Danquah
and Ouattara 2015 and Christopoulos and León-Ledesma 2014.
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have adopted the civil law instead of common law. The actual average efficiency score for
common law countries in 1970 is 0.443. The estimated efficiency differential between the two
legal regimes is 1.99% implying that the predicted efficiency score for common law countries
would have been 0.452 in 1970. From (7), predicted efficiency in Common law countries in 2013
would have been 0.83, while the actual is 0.65, thus Efficiency losses at the order of 22% (i.e.,
1-(0.65/0.83)).22
4 Conclusions
We study the impact of coloniser’s legal tradition on national efficiency of former African
(SSA) colonies explicitly conditioning the effects on the degree of ethnic fragmentation. The
colonial states were characterised by differential styles of political and economic governance in
ruling their colonies. On the one hand, we have the more centralised state under the French
civil law system, while on the other hand, we have the less decentralised state of the British
common law system. We argue that the parsimonious and systematic way to capture the
differences between styles of colonial governance is to see them through the lenses of legal
origins. In that context, legal origins are the legal prototypes that were transplanted in the
former colonies and maintained in the post-independence era. Our study is placed within
the strand of literature that looks at how historical aspects of the institutional framework
drive current outcomes in African countries. More importantly, differences in legal tradition
have significant implications for how countries deal with ethnic heterogeneity and conflict.
The degree of ethnic fragmentation in Africa countries is persistently high with substantial
consequences on socio-economic outcomes. Therefore, it is important to understand how legal
traditions interact with ethnic heterogeneity in shaping current economic performance. To our
knowledge, our study is the first that explores the interplay between ethnic heterogeneity and
legal origins within an integrated economic governance context.
Within a multi-faceted empirical analysis for 35 SSA countries over the period 1970-2010, we
incorporate the role of legal origins and ethical heterogeneity, first within a standard income per
capita regression framework and second, we study their effect as an in(efficiency) determinants
within an aggregate production function. Two channels are identified through which civil
law, drives economic outcomes. First, the French civil law system can enforce coordination
better due to its centralised orientation, which leads to more efficient use of natural resources;
and second, civil law tends to guarantee greater political stability. Our empirical analysis
confirms that civil law delivers better economic outcomes in countries with a high degree of
ethnic heterogeneity. Our findings contradict the standard belief to date that common law is
universally the most appropriate legal framework for economic activity. The last point may well
22Appendix D shows the plots of actual versus predicted efficiency trends for the sub-sample of Common law
SSA countries.
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be true if one neglects ethnic heterogeneity. However, in countries with inherited substantial
ethnic fragmentation centralised administration handles better social and ethnic conflicts, which
is undoubtedly beneficial for the use of natural resources and national inputs. We should, of
course, mention that there is possibly a cost of greater political stability, under French civil
law relative to British common law, that of a less pluralistic and institutional democracy. As
far as the role of other traditional economic factors is concerned, human capital, trade and a
well-functioning financial market are equally important in the economic growth process.
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Source
y 3.83 0.66 0.66 5.72 PWT 8.0
k 3.79 0.53 0.73 5.77 PWT 8.0
l 3.29 0.73 0.53 4.38 PWT 8.0
h 0.54 0.29 -0.54 1.03 Barro and Lee 2013
Civil 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 La Porta et al. 1999
Ethnic 0.63 0.22 0.04 0.93 Alesina et al. 2003
Resources 14.83 15.77 0.03 85.82 WDI
FDI 8.75 17.65 0.00 251.59 WDI
Trade 40.34 24.48 2.04 250.50 WDI
Credit 30.98 41.07 0.00 300.08 WDI
Stability -0.10 1.00 -1.92 1.97 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009
Conflict 5.05 2.13 1.00 10.00 Stiftung 2014
Polity -2.78 6.09 -10.00 10.00 Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003
Life 55.87 10.33 27.08 80.13 WDI
Man 11.50 6.34 0.89 41.72 WDI
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Appendix B: Average Efficiency Scores, Legal Origins and Ethnic
Heterogeneity
Country(Legal Origin) Efficiency Ethnic




Nigeria (Common) 0.7034 0.8505
Burundi(Civil) 0.7327 0.2951
Zambia (Common) 0.7129 0.7808
Namibia (Common) 0.7232 0.6329
Angola(Civil) 0.7280 0.7867
Sierra Leone (Common) 0.7163 0.8191
Gabon(Civil) 0.7214 0.7690
South Africa (Common) 0.6960 0.7517
Gambia (Common) 0.6759 0.7864
Mozambique(Civil) 0.7000 0.6932







Kenya (Common) 0.6721 0.8588
Malawi (Common) 0.6705 0.6744
Ethiopia(Civil) 0.6631 0.6900
Benin(Civil) 0.6594 0.7872
Ghana (Common) 0.6549 0.6733
Togo(Civil) 0.6526 0.7099
Central Africa (Civil) 0.6490 0.8295
Madagascar(Civil) 0.7425 0.8791
Niger(Civil) 0.6376 0.6518
Swaziland (Common) 0.6303 0.0582
Cote d’Ivoire(Civil) 0.6310 0.8204
Guinea-Bissau (Civil) 0.6250 0.8082
Tanzania (Common) 0.6118 0.7353




Appendix C: Additional Specifications
Translog Specification of the National
Production Function with Polity, Life














































Log lik. -631.73 110.21
Wald 7659.83 12743.44
Wald p 0 0.77
λ 0.57 0.87
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
***denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 10% significance;* denotes 10%
All specifications include time fixed effects in the frontier equation.
Polity variable measures the quality of democracy in a society.
The index of Polity takes values from -10(strongly autocratic regime) to +10 (strongly democratic regime).
We refer to Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003 and Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014 for further discussion.
Wald test refers to the hypothesis that all estimated parameters in the inefficiency equation are jointly zero.
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Appendix D: Actual and Predicted Efficiency in Common Law Countries
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